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Abstract: In this paper we survey the theoretical literature on both pollution-reducing and 
resource-saving technological progress. The literature can be divided into two strands. One 
strand deals with microeconomic models which investigate incentives to adopt and to develop 
environmentally more friendly technologies for different policy tools and in different 
economic environments, such as market structure or timing and commitment structures. It 
turns out that, firstly, price based instruments such as emission taxes and tradable permits 
perform better than command and control policies, and secondly, that under competitive 
conditions ex ante end ex post optimal policies are equivalent. Under imperfect market 
conditions the policy conclusions are more subtile. The second strand of literature deals with 
both pollution-reducing and resource-saving technological progress within endogenous 
growth models. Most of these models are characterized by three market imperfections: market 
power for new (intermediate) products, positive R&D spillovers, and pollution. These 
imperfections can be mitigated by subsidies on intermediate products, subsidies on R&D 
effort, and a tax on emissions. Moreover, in most models there occurs a trade-off between the 
speed of growth and environmental quality.  
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In the literature of innovation and technological progress, one usually distinguishes between 
product and process innovation. Product innovation reflects the idea that consumers either enjoy 
higher quality of certain products, which in principle serve the same purpose as the old products, or 
they enjoy a greater variety of products. Process innovation, by contrast, means the same products 
can be produced at a lower cost.
1 Both kinds of innovations are driven by market forces: A firm 
which offers a new product gains a rent, either because it is able to exploit the difference between 
the price charged by the competitors and its own marginal cost, as is the case with process 




* We are grateful to Paul Mensink for valuable comments. innovation, or because the consumers’ willingness to pay for a new product is larger than for the 
conventional products.  
Resource-saving technological progress can fall into both categories. A product innovation can be 
resource saving in two different ways. The new product may require less resources as input for 
production, or it might itself need less energy in the process of consumption. However, it is usually 
not the case that new products which yield higher utility to consumers are automatically also less 
resource intensive than old products. A good example are innovations of cars: cars that are faster 
and safer typically require more resources for production, and, even more severe, they need more 
energy when being employed by consumers.  
If a producer of some commodity is able to produce the same amount of output with smaller 
quantities of input resources, we can consider this as a case of process innovation. The existence of 
a new production process which induces lower unit costs does, however, not imply that the new 
process requires smaller amounts of all resources necessary for production. Rather, the new 
production process might substitute some inputs for others. From an economic perspective this is in 
principle not a problem and is even socially beneficial as long as prices reflect the true scarcity and 
the true social costs of all the resources. This, however, need not always be the case for at least four 
reasons
2: First, some resources may not be subject to well defined property rights but rather are 
harvested from a common pool, such as deep sea fish and timber. In a case like this, input prices 
reflect only the harvest cost but not the shadow prices of scarcity. Secondly, during the production 
process some resources may cause pollution and thus a damage to society which is not accounted 
for in the resource prices. Prominent examples are sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide, the first one 
causing direct damages through asset rain, the second one generating indirect damages, notably to 
future generations, through global warming. Thirdly, as Farzin [24] has pointed out, if the unit costs 
of extraction depend on the size of the remaining stock, a unit of the resource exploited today will 
inflict an intertemporal externality to future generations by pushing up extraction costs at all future 
dates. And, finally, market prices of some resources, particularly non-renewables such as fossil 
 
 
2 fuels, may differ from their social value for another intertemporal reason: market interest rate may 
not necessarily reflect the social discount rate.
3 
Therefore, pure market forces emerging in a competitive non-regulated economy might not per se 
induce resource- or pollution-saving technological progress. Even if they do, the right direction of 
technological progress is not guaranteed, i.e. not necessarily those resources with the highest social 
shadow prices are saved in the first place. 
In cases like these, environmental and resource policy can help to close the gap between market and 
social shadow prices. Hence, the issue of pollution-reducing and resource-saving technological 
progress cannot be studied properly without including environmental policy instruments into the 
analysis.  
The aim of this paper is to survey recent developments on pollution-reducing and resource-saving 
technological progress. In particular, we emphasize environmental policy instruments as the driving 
forces for this special kind of technological progress. The bulk of literature can be classified in 
different ways. We decided to make the following distinction. Firstly, there is the literature on 
incentives to reduce pollution, both in the short and in the long run. Secondly, there is the 
intertemporal aspect of resource-saving technological progress. In particular the endogenous growth 
theory has incorporated the issue of resource-saving technological progress in order to answer the 
question whether or not non-declining growth paths are feasible in the presence of finite amounts of 
certain resources, in particular energy stemming from fossil fuels.  
Hence, the paper is devided into two parts: In section 2 we first set up some definitions and model 
frameworks in order to define pollution-reducing technological progress. Then we survey the 
literature on pollution-reducing technological progress, studying microeconomic models. In section 
3 we summarize the work on pollution-reducing and resource-saving technological progress in the 
framework of endogenous growth theory. Although those models consider different stages of 
aggregation, the macroeconomic perspective prevails.  
 
 
3 2 Pollution-Reducing  Technological  Progress 
We start to survey microeconomic partial equilibrium models which are static or quasi-dynamic in 
the sense that they allow for sequential decisions by a regulator, an innovating sector, and firms 
which adopt new technology. Except for Parry et al. [60], the authors of these models do not 
explicitly capture the aspect of time. It is convenient to first introduce some definitions and basic 
concepts which are typically used in the literature of pollution-reducing technological progress to be 
summarized below in more detail. 
2.1  Definitions and Model Frameworks 
2.1.1  Abatement Technology and Pollution-Reducing Technological Progress 
For a polluting firm there are basically two strategies to reduce pollutants: either to reduce gross 
emissions by reducing output, or to keep output constant and to reduce emissions by employing an 
abatement technology. In general, a mix of both will be optimal. Concerning the abatement 
technologies, experts usually distinguish between end-of-pipe technologies and process integrated 
technologies. The latter leads to a decline in gross emissions, whereas with the former gross 
emissions remain unchanged and are subsequently decreased, for example through a filter. In both 
cases the abatement technology can be represented by its abatement cost function C , which 
represents a firm’s cost to reduce emissions from the laisser-faire emission level   to some lower 
level  . Typically, both the abatement cost function and the marginal abatement cost 
function are downward sloping. Note that a firm’s abatement cost is nothing else than its forgone 
profit incurred by reducing emissions.
) (e
max e
max e e <
4 It is straightforward to show that such an abatement cost 
function can be derived from a firm’s joint cost function which may incorporate both cost of 
production and cost of abatement.
5 Note further that if firms are small and thus cannot influence the 
output prices, there is no need to explicitly pay attention to the output market. 
 
 
4 Pollution-reducing technological progress can now be defined by a downward shift of the 
abatement cost curve. In most of the literature an even stronger assumption is made, namely that 
also the marginal abatement cost curve shifts downwards. If, by contrast, pollution is proportional 
to output and if there is no further short run abatement technology, pollution-reducing technological 
progress can be modelled by decreasing emission coefficients (i.e. reducing the emission-output-
ratio). In this case, lower emission coefficients do not necessarily lead to declining marginal 
abatement costs if emission levels are already low.  
2.1.2  Pollution Control Instruments 
As mentioned above, pure market forces do not necessarily induce pollution-reducing technological 
progress, a fact which calls for regulation. Economists distinguish mainly between two types of 
pollution control instruments: command and control, and market based instruments. The most 
common instruments of command and control are technological standards (a regulatory authority 
might prescribe the firms to adopt the best available technology), emission standards (firms are 
constrained by an absolute upper emission level), and finally, so called generation performance or 
relative standards (firms face a cap on the ratio of emissions per output), which is the most 
commonly applied standard in reality. 
Market based instruments, by contrast, provide incentives to reduce emissions through prices, and 
firms are free to decide how much they want to emit or to abate. The most commonly used market 
based instruments are emission taxes, subsidies on abatement of emissions, and tradable permits. 
Under emission taxes and abatement subsidies the prices for emissions are administrated by a 
regulator. If she levies a linear tax per unit of a pollutant or pays a subsidy per unit of abated 
emissions, then each firm has to pay (gets) the same marginal price for each unit of pollution it 
emits (abates). Under permits, a firm must hold one permit for each unit of pollution it wants to 
emit. Usually, firms can trade those permits with other firms. There are two allocation schemes for 
permits: free allocation according to historical emission or output levels (often referred to as 
 
 
5 grandfathering) or auctioning off the permits in which case the firms have to pay for each unit of the 
pollutant they are going to emit. In contrast to the tax rate, the market price of permits is determined 
endogenously by the market mechanism.  
Economists usually prefer market based over command and control instruments by virtue of their 
static efficiency. For, under competitive conditions, market based instruments lead to equalization 
of marginal abatement costs across firms, a necessary condition for achieving an aggregate emission 
target at least costs.If markets are competitive, regulation by prices (taxes or subsidies) and 
regulation by quantities (tradable permits) is equivalent. The dynamic properties, in particular the 
innovation incentives of these instruments are, however, more complex and subject to discussion 
below.  
2.1.3  How to Compare Incentives for Adoption, Diffusion and Innovation 
When comparing the incentives for adoption, diffusion, and innovation provided by different policy 
instruments, it is natural to begin with the incentives for adoption. In a first step this can at best be 
analyzed from the perspective of a single firm. The incentive for adoption is simply given by the 
firm’s additional total profit from switching to the new, exogenously given technology. In case of a 
market based instrument like an emission tax or a system of tradable permits, a firm adopts a new 
technology if and only if  
0 0 0 ) ( ) ( pe e C F pe e C I I I + < + +      (1) 
where   and C  are the abatement costs of the new and the old technology, respectively, 
F denotes the fixed investment costs and p the price of emissions, which can be the tax rate or the 
price of tradable permits, respectively.
) ( I I e C ) ( 0 0 e
6 
The  rate of  diffusion refers to the percentage of firms adopting the new technology. The 
incentives for adoption and the rate of diffusion are interrelated. In particular in the case of tradable 




6 The incentive for innovation refers to the benefit a firm enjoys from developing and inventing a 
new technology. Firms engaging in the research and development of pollution-reducing 
technologies are either part of the polluting industry itself and thus use the new technology 
themselves or they engage in R&D exclusively in order to sell or license their new technology to a 
polluting sector. In the first case, the innovator’s benefit is determined by the change of her 
compliance costs (including short run abatement cost, revenues from emission subsidies or permit 
sales, expenditures for emission taxes or permit purchases) and the change of her profit on the 
output market. This benefit might be enhanced by license fees, and it may be reduced by other firms 
imitating the new technology. In the second case, the innovator’s benefit depends on the polluting 
firms’ willingness to pay for the new technology, which in turn is determined by the adoption costs, 
by the change of compliance costs, and by the profits those firms accrue from adopting the new 
technology. Again, the possibility of imitation has a diminishing effect on the innovator’s benefit. 
Figure 1 illustrates the change of an adopting firm’s compliance costs under an emission tax.
7  
Depending on the kind of regulation, a potential innovator will put a certain effort into R&D. A 
higher effort may either lead to a higher degree of innovation (for example a more radical shift of 
both the abatement and the marginal abatement cost curves), or induce either an increased 
probability or an earlier date of success. A profit maximizing innovator chooses an effort level such 
that the marginal (expected) benefit equals the marginal cost of R&D. Denicolò [19]( p. 186) points 
out that the innovation incentive of the different instruments can be correctly measured by the 
innovator’s respective profits if her “R&D investment cannot affect the nature of the innovation and 
hence the reduction in effluent emissions that it entails.” Otherwise, “it is the marginal profit that 




It is important to note that the distinction between investment into adoption and into innovation is 
not always sharp. Some authors such as Phaneuf and Requate[64], Petrakis and Xepapadeas[62], or 
Gersbach and Requate [28] assume cost functions of the form C  where e denotes emissions 
and  k can be interpreted as both investment into abatement equipment or R&D effort. In the 
) , ( k eliterature survey following below, we subsume a paper under a model of innovation (in contrast to a 
model of adoption) when the respective model contains at least one of the following aspects: Firstly, 
a stochastic element is incorporated, i.e. the size of innovation, its date, or the R&D success is 
uncertain, secondly a patent is granted on the innovation, thirdly spillovers occur, or finally 
imitation is accounted for. 
2.1.4  Possible Timing and Commitment Strategies of the Regulator 
When analyzing diffusion, innovation, and technological progress it is important to distinguish the 
possible timing and commitment strategies of the regulator. This basically boils down to the 
question of who is the first to move, the regulator or the firms. If the regulator moves first and is 
able to make a commitment to the level of her policy instrument, we talk about ex ante regulation 
or ex ante commitment. A myopic regulator does not anticipate a new technology and therefore 
commits ex ante to a level of her policy instrument which is optimal with respect to the 
conventional technology. If, by contrast, the firms move first, by engaging in R&D or by adopting a 
new technology, and the regulator moves second, by adapting the level of her policy instrument to 
the respective R&D outcome or to the rate of adoption of new technology, we talk about ex post 
regulation. If the regulator has no incentive to change her behavior after firms have moved, her 
policy is called time consistent. The adjustment of her policy in case of a time inconsistent policy is 
sometimes called ratcheting. Note, that ex post regulation is always time consistent.
8 The early 
literature usually considers the regulator as the natural first mover whereas more recent 
contributions emphasize the importance to also study the regulator's reaction on innovation and 
technology adoption. 
2.2  Results of Models on Adoption, Diffusion and Innovation Incentives 
In this section we focus on theoretical microeconomic partial equilibrium models. Among those we 
can distinguish two types of models: firstly, those which analyze the incentives for adoption and 
diffusion of the environmental policy instruments only; secondly, models which look at both, the 
 
 
8 innovation and diffusion incentives. We will not review the early papers on this topic in detail. The 
interested reader is referred to Kemp [42], Jaffe et al. [39]. 
2.2.1  Models of Adoption and Diffusion Only 
The models summarized in this section differ, on the one hand, with respect to the behavior of the 
regulator, who is assumed to either act myopically or to engage in ex ante or ex post regulation. On 
the other hand, they differ with respect to whether or not they pay attention to the output market, or 
whether or not they include uncertainty. Table 1 summarizes the different features of the models 
that we describe in more detail below. 
2.2.1.1 Myopic  Regulation 
The first contributions dealing with adoption of a new abatement technology are those by Downing 
and White [22], Milliman and Prince [51], and Malueg [49]. For different types of pollution control 
instruments the authors compare the aggregate cost savings incurred by industry when adopting a 
new technology. By ex ante assuming an industry wide adoption of the new technology, Milliman 
and Prince arrive at the following (descending) ranking of policy instruments with respect to those 
cost savings: 1) auctioned permits, 2) emission taxes and abatement subsidies, 3) free permits, 4) 
emission standards. Jung et al. [40] confirm this ranking employing a more formal analysis.  
Both, Kennedy and Laplante [44], and Requate and Unold [73] criticize the approach by those 
authors by pointing out that, firstly, equilibrium considerations must be taken into account when 
studying the incentives to adopt new technology, and secondly, that the number of firms which 
adopt the new technology must be determined endogenously.  
One of the scenarios investigated by Requate and Unold [73] corresponds to those studied by both, 
Milliman and Prince [51] and Jung et al. [40], in assuming the regulator to be myopic.
9 For this 
scenario Requate and Unold look at the incentives to adopt the new technology in equilibrium and 
compare those for emission taxes, abatement subsidies, free and auctioned permits, and an emission 
standard. Assuming symmetric firms, they find that taxes usually provide higher incentives than 
 
 
9 permits and standards, and that the comparison between standards and permits is ambiguous, i.e. 
depending on parameters, standards may even provide stronger incentives to adopt the new 
technology than permits. Moreover, in this scenario, one will typically observe overinvestment 
under regulation by taxes and underinvestment under regulation by permits. In a model which 
explicitly accounts for both production cost and output market, Requate [69] comes to similar 
results for the case of free market entry.  
2.2.1.2  Anticipating New Technology, Timing, and Commitment 
We now turn our attention to scenarios where the regulator anticipates the evolution of a new 
technology, and focus on the issue of timing and commitment, and the difference between ex post 




Kennedy and Laplante [44], analyze a similar model as Requate [69] where symmetric firms behave 
as price takers on the output market and choose whether or not to adopt a new abatement 
technology that lowers their marginal abatement costs but incurs fixed investment costs. 
Considering a scenario where the regulator anticipates the new technology and makes an ex ante 
commitment to the level of her policy instrument, the authors study the time consistency of 
emission taxes and permit policies. They find that, if the environmental damage function is linear, 
ex ante commitment is time consistent for both instruments, no matter how many polluting firms 
are in the market. If, instead, the damage function is convex, time inconsistencies arise if the 
number of firms is relatively small. By contrast, ex post regulation, referred to as “ratcheting”, is 
time consistent by definition. However, firms then tend to underinvest in the new technology under 
permits (too little adoption) and to overinvest under taxes (too much adoption). For a continuum of 
firms no inconsistencies arise even if the damage function is convex. In a model with many (a 
continuum of) asymmetric firms, Requate and Unold [72] come to a similar result. They even show 
that both, optimal ex ante and optimal ex post regulation lead to first best allocations for all of the 
following environmental policy instruments: emissions taxes, subsidies on abatement, auctioned 
permits and free permits. Uniform standards, of course, cannot induce the optimal rate of adoption due to their static inefficiency. In the symmetric version of the model Requate and Unold [73] 
confirm the optimality of ex ante and ex post regulation for the case of permits. Under taxes, by 
contrast, a first best allocation can only be obtained for the case of ex post regulation. For the case 
of ex ante regulation taxes may induce inefficient equilibria is case that partial adoption is socially 
optimal. 
Petrakis and Xepapadeas [61] investigate regulation of a single monopolistic polluting firm that can 
choose among a menu of new technologies where the emissions-per-output-coefficients are lower 
than the one of the conventional technology. Assuming specific functional forms, in particular 
linear damage, and focusing on an emission tax as the only policy instrument, the authors compare 
ex ante commitment
10 to “non-credible environmental policies” with respect to the optimal level of 
investment, the optimal emission tax, and welfare. In the latter scenario the regulator cannot 
credibly commit ex ante to an emission tax rate and the monopolist anitcipates the regulator´s 
change of the tax rate after his investment decision. Since the monopolist then can influence the tax 
rate, she will always invest more than in the case of ex ante commitment. Therefore, both the 
emission tax and welfare are always higher under ex ante commitment. 
Amacher and Malik [3] analyze the incentive for adoption for a single firm under an emission tax 
only. The firm can choose between a “cleaner” abatement technology that incurs high fixed but low 
marginal cost and a “dirtier” technology which incurs low fixed but high marginal cost. A first best 
outcome is achieved if the firm adopts the “cleaner” technology and emits the respective socially 
optimal emission level. The second best outcome is defined as the firm adopting the “dirtier” 
technology and emitting the corresponding socially optimal amount of emissions. If the regulator 
commits ex ante to an emission tax rate and if the damage function is strictly convex, then it is 
possible that neither the first nor the second best outcome will be achieved: The Pigouvian tax, 
optimal with respect to one technology may prompt the firm to adopt the other one, and the 
emission level would not be socially optimal. With ex post regulation by contrast, the first or the 
second best outcome are the only possible equilibria. The authors show that the firm is always 
 
 
11 better off under ex post regulation whereas the regulator, depending on parameters, may either 
prefer ex ante or ex post regulation. 
2.2.1.3 Imperfect  Competition 
In all the models discussed so far, the authors have either explicitly or implicitly assumed that the 
output markets are perfectly competitive. A couple of models pay explicit attention to imperfect 
competition on the output market and its consequences for adoption and regulation. 
Requate [70] reconfirms the phenomenon of multiple equilibria under ex ante commitment to a tax 
policy, known from Requate and Unold [73], for the case of a polluting Cournot oligopoly with free 
entry.  
Carraro and Soubeyran [14] study a Cournot-duopoly with polluting firms that choose how many 
plants to run, whether to use a “cleaner” or “dirtier” technology, and the respective capacity 
utilization. The “cleaner” technology is associated with a lower emissions-per-output coefficient but 
with higher fixed and variable costs than the “dirty” one. The authors derive the ex ante optimal 
emission tax, when only the “dirtier” plants’ emissions are taxed and show that it is lower than 
marginal damage, which is assumed to be linear. Further, they derive the optimal innovation 
subsidy, where the regulator pays a proportional part of the fixed costs of the “cleaner” plants. Both 
instruments prompt the firms to use the “cleaner” technology if its supply is not constraint. 
Otherwise both technologies are used. The welfare comparison of the instruments is ambigous: If 
the output contraction induced by the tax is negligible or if the regulator considers output 
contraction as undesireable and the supply of “cleaner” plants is unlimited, welfare turns out to be 
higher under innovation subsidies. If instead the supply of the “cleaner” plants is limited and the 
number of “dirtier” plants which the firms keep using is large, the emission tax may become the 




Montero [53] is mainly interested in the investment incentives of tradable permits and two kinds of 
standards, emission and performance standards, but rules out the possibility of taxation. Besides 
allowing for perfect and imperfect competition on the output market, he is one of the very few researchers who models imperfect competition on both, the output and the permit market.
11 In his 
model ex ante symmetric firms produce a homogenous good and emit a pollutant. The firms can 
choose among different abatement technologies that are associated with lower marginal abatement 
costs than the conventional one. In contrast to the other approaches, however, there is no damage 
function, and thus optimal pollution levels are not considered. Rather, the regulator aims at 
enforcing an exogenously given aggregate emission standard. The R&D incentives are compared by 
means of the respective marginal profits. The total effect of a typical firm’s investment decision 
consists of a direct cost effect and, in case of imperfect competition, of a strategic effect on both the 
output and the permit market. The direct effect, which always prompts the firms to invest, is the 
same for permits and emission standards. Under performance standards it is lower. The strategic 
effect with respect to the output market causes the firms to invest more under standards, but less 
under permits. In the former case the investment lowers the competitors output, in the latter it raises 
its output. It turns out that the strategic effect from the permits market is only relevant under 
auctioned permits: since all firms are permit buyers, they benefit from a lower permit price due to 
higher investment. Hence, for imperfect competition on both markets Montero finds the following: 
Both, an emission standard and a regime of auctioned permits provide a higher incentive to invest 
than free permits, whereas a performance standard may provide a higher, a lower, or the same 
investment incentive than both free permits and the emission standard. Finally, both types of 
standards may provide a higher, a lower or the same incentive to invest than auctioned permits. If 
there is perfect competition on both markets, only the direct effect matters. Thus an emission 
standard, free and auctioned permits provide the same incentives, whereas the incentive provided by 
the performance standard is lower. Interestingly, the results are qualitatively the same if there is 
imperfect competition on the permit market only. For imperfect competition on the output market 
only, Montero finds that the incentives for tradeable and auctioned permits are equivalent whereas 
an emission standard may provide a higher incentive than permits. These findings are in line with 




13 2.2.1.4 Including  Uncertainty 
A couple of contributions take into account different kinds of ex ante uncertainty in dynamic 
models with two or three periods where the uncertainty will usually be resolved in the second 
period: Laffont and Tirole [45] assume uncertainty about the benefits which the firms accrue from 
emitting pollutants, Kennedy [43] considers uncertainty about environmental damage, whereas in 
Phaneuf and Requate [64] the abatement cost is subject to uncertainty. Van Soest and Bulte [90] 
and Van Soest [89] take into account the uncertainty about technological progress. 
Laffont and Tirole [45] analyze optimal regulation of many (a continuum of) potentially polluting 
asymmetric firms in a two period model, where in both periods, firms can either emit one unit or 
nothing. Firms are regulated by emission permits. In the first period full abatement requires the 
firms to cease production, whereas in the second period they can use an abatement technology 
which they had to purchase in the first period. In the first period firms know their benefit from 
pollution in period 1 but not that of period 2. Only the probability distribution of those benefits is 
known. This uncertainty is resolved in the second period. A novelty of this model is that the shadow 
cost of public funds is taken into account. Thus the regulator chooses the optimal Ramsey permit 
price (respectively the corresponding amount of permits) in period 1. The authors show that if the 
permit market is a pure spot market, i.e. if the regulator issues permits in each period, and in the 
first period is not able to make a commitment about the second-period permit price, then excessive 
investment incentives are created. A too high permit price prompts the firms to bypass the permit 
market via adoption of the abatement technology. By commiting to a lower second-period permit 
price, especially by introduction of a futures market, the regulator can enhance welfare by 
discouraging unwanted investment. However, committing to a lower second-period price in the first 
period, is not time consistent. For, a marginal increase in the number of permits in the second 
period increases welfare. A price support policy or options to pollute, issued in period 1, allow the 
regulator to solve this problem of time inconsistency. It is important to note, however, that the over-
 
 
14 investment result hinges on the assumption that the regulator wants to collect money from 
auctioning off permits in order to mitigate the social costs of public funds.  
Kennedy [43] sets up a two period model where in the first period the (constant) marginal damage 
may be high or low. Given this uncertainty, a large number of polluting firms has to decide whether 
or not to adopt an improved abatement technology which incurs fixed costs and lower marginal 
abatement costs. Kennedy assumes a very special scheme of permit trading, rarely used in real 
existing policy frameworks: one permit allows the emission of one unit of pollution in each period 
of time (rather than just for one period).
13 When uncertainty about the marginal damage is resolved 
in the second period, the regulator can adjust the number of permits. Kennedy considers two kinds 
of adjustment rules which both implement the social optimum, if announced in period 1: firstly, 
open market operations, i.e. buying back permits if the marginal damage turns out to be high, and 
auctioning off more permits if the damage is low, and secondly, a proportional adjustment rule, 
where firms lose a fraction of their permit endowment if the damage is high, or get more permits 
proportional to their initial endowment if damage is low. Kennedy argues that the first rule is 
unlikely to be implemented since firms will be rewarded if the expected damage turns out to be 
higher than expected. Phaneuf and Requate [64] examine the effects of banking permits on the 
incentives to invest in advanced abatement technology if there is aggregate uncertainty about the 
abatement cost. To this end they set up a three period model where in the pre-regulation period 0, 
firms can invest in an abatement technology. In the periods 1 and 2, respectively, the uncertainty 
about the abatement cost is resolved. Banking allows firms to postpone investment until more 
information on the abatement costs is revealed. The authors find that, if the discount factor is 
sufficiently small, and if period 1 costs are revealed to be low, then there will be positive banking 
but no first period investment. If instead period 1 costs are revealed to be high, there will be no 
banking but positive first period investment. The analysis of the constrained (total endowment of 
permits is fixed) socially optimal response of the firms to the resolution of uncertainty shows that 
the regulator will be interested in some banking, but that private and social optimal response to the 
 
 
15 resolution of uncertainty are not identical. This can lead to sub-optimal levels of investment in 
improved technology. A unique conclusion concerning the savings of social cost through banking is 
not possible, though. For a quadratic cost and damage function it is shown that banking leads to 
lower costs for society if the damage function is relatively flat. Otherwise non-banking is preferred.  
Van Soest and Bulte [90] study the problem of technology adoption for the case that future 
technological advances are uncertain. For this purpose they apply the option value approach 
developed by Dixit and Pindyck [20], and having been applied to the problem of technology 
adoption by Farzin et al. [25], and improved by Doraszelski [21]. Van Soest and Bulte show that 
even if adoption of new technology pays according to the criterion of net present value 
comparisons, it may not be profitable if further improvements may occur. Hence the firm is better 
off by postponing the adoption decision to the point of time when an even better technology is 
available. Using this calculus they offer an explanation why firms do not invest, although it seems 
favourable to do so. In a companion paper Van Soest [89] uses this approach to compare energy 
taxes to absolute energy use standards with respect to the incentive to adopt improved energy-
efficient technologies. However, no unambiguous ranking of the two instruments is possible with 
respect to better stimulating early adoption of new technology. Moreover, he surprisingly finds that 
firms tend to postpone the adoption of improved technology if environmental policy is more 
stringent. 




Gersbach and Glazer [27] identify incentives for firms to hold up innovation. In their model the 
regulator aims at prompting all (ex ante symmetric) firms of an oligopolistic, polluting industry to 
adopt a certain abatement technology at a fixed cost and to abate the corresponding optimal amount 
of emissions. If a firm does not invest, it can only abate emissions by reducing its output. A crucial, 
and most unusual assumption is that the social benefit of the last unit of output exceeds its social 
cost of pollution. Hence, the regulator will never force a non-investing firm to abate emissions. 
Anticipating this dilemma of the regulator, firms have an incentive not to invest into the new technology. Gersbach and Glazer show that this hold-up problem can be overcome by ex post 
issuing free permits, assuming a competitive equilibrium on the permit market. In equilibrium all 
firms invest if the number of firms is as least two. 
2.2.2  Models of Innovation and Diffusion 
We now include innovation into the analysis. The models summarized in this subsection have 
mainly in common that, ex post, there is always one innovator whereas ex ante there may be several 
potential innovators engaging in a patent race. The innovator can either sell or license the 
technology to other firms which decide whether or not to adopt it. The various models differ with 
respect to the following main issues: firstly, which policy instruments are subject to investigation, 
secondly which timing and commitment strategies are feasible for the regulator or which strategy 
she is assumed to pursue, thirdly, whether R&D success is stochastic or deterministic, forth, 
whether the marginal damage is constant or increasing, and finally whether or not special attention 
is paid to the output market. Table 2 gives an overview about the special features and assumptions 
of the different models. 
2.2.2.1  Innovation Incentives and Welfare Gains under Perfect Competition 
Biglaiser and Horowitz [6] and Parry [58], [59] were the first to rigorously combine the issues of 
innovation and adoption. Biglaiser and Horowitz [6] look at a competitive polluting industry with 
an exogenously given number of ex ante symmetric firms each of which can engage in R&D. The 
new technology is randomly drawn from a cumulative distribution which is the same for all firms. 
Thus, innovation size and R&D success are stochastic. A patent is granted to a successful firm, and 
other firms can use this technology when paying a license fee and installation costs. Since adoption 
costs are independent of which particular technology is adopted, the regulator always wants an 
adopting firm to adopt the best available technology. If the regulator ex interim
14 (i.e. after R&D 
but before adoption) commits to both an emission tax equal to marginal damage and to a 
technological standard, which either specifies the firms which have to adopt the best available 
 
 
17 technology or which specifies the firms which have to adopt the “lowest acceptable” technology, 
then efficient pollution, production and adoption are induced. The level of R&D effort, however, is 
too low, compared to the socially optimal level. 
Parry [58] sharply separates the polluting sector from the R&D sector. There is free entry on both 
markets. Each upstream firm conducts one R&D project to develop a new abatement technology for 
the polluting downstream sector but does not need it for its own production. Both the probability of 
R&D success and the industry’s R&D cost rise with the number of R&D firms. If a firm is 
successful, it is granted a patent and becomes a monopolist. The ex ante symmetric downstream 
firms can adopt the new technology by paying a license fee. Parry shows that a rising tax rate leads 
to a smaller number of polluting firms in the downstream market. Since those with the highest 
willingness to pay for the new technology stay in the market, a higher tax also induces a higher 
license fee. Parry studies only the tax instrument with the regulator committing to the tax rate 
before the upstream firms engage in R&D.He derives the second best optimal tax rate for the cases 
of -convex damage and linear damage with and without the possibility of costless imitation. If 
imitation is not possible, the second best optimal tax rate turns out to be smaller whereas with 
imitation it may be smaller or greater than marginal damage. 
In another variant of this model Parry [59] allows for incomplete diffusion and besides taxes also 
studies tradable permits and an instrument mix consisting of a performance standard and a 
production quota. For permits and performance standards he distinguishes the cases of ex ante and 
interim commitment. Employing numerical simulations he finds that emission taxes yield higher 
welfare than permits, with the difference depending crucially on the potential size of innovation. 
The same holds for performance standards under ex ante commitment. For interim commitment, 
however, the difference in efficiency almost vanishes. The case of emission taxes shows that 
imitation does not necessarily imply large inefficiency in the R&D market. Therefore, imitation 




18 Fischer et al. [26] abstract from R&D races by considering a model with a large number of 
competitive polluting firms, only one of which, called the innovator, is able to engage in R&D in 
order to improve its own abatement technology in the first place. The other symmetric polluting 
firms can either pay a license fee to adopt the new technology, or they can freely use an (im)perfect 
imitation. Despite this possibility, complete diffusion is socially optimal. Considering emission 
taxes, auctioned and free permits as policy instruments the regulator is assumed to be myopic by ex 
ante committing to the Pigouvian levels with respect to the conventional technology. For the case of 
constant marginal damage the authors find that if no imitation is possible, emission taxes induce the 
first best outcome, whereas permits do not. If imitation is possible, the welfare gain under taxes is 
higher than that under free permits. Depending on the degree of imperfection of imitation, welfare 
under taxes might exceed or fall short of welfare under auctioned permits. Emission taxes are 
superior if imitation is easy. For the case of increasing marginal damage the authors find that the 
steeper the marginal damage curve the more do permits dominate the tax regime. Note that in 
equilibrium imitation never occurs. It only serves as an outside option for the polluting firms and 
thus drives down the licence fee. Note further that in contrast to Requate and Unold [72] and [73], 
free and auctioned permits are not equivalent in this model since the innovator is able to exercise 
market power and his price strategy depends on his own initial endowment of permits.  
Laffont and Tirole [46] study the innovation incentives of permits in a regime where, just as in their 
companion paper[45], the regulator faces a shadow cost of public funds and thus is interested in 
reducing the burden on taxpayers by means of permit revenues. A single upstream firm engages in 
R&D and might invent a pollution-free technology. The authors show that if the regulator commits 
ex interim (after R&D but before innovator’s pricing decision) to a permit price, the innovator does 
not engage in R&D because she will make no profit. Since permits and innovation are perfect 
substitutes, the innovator will always undercut the permit price which drives down the price to zero. 
Laffont and Tirole further find, that if the regulator prior to R&D sells a certain amount of permits 
and commits himself not to issue additional permits on the spot market after R&D success, then the 
 
 
19 innovation incentive is still sub-optimal and induced adoption may be sub-optimal as 
well.Emissions are too high in case of R&D success. However, the regulator can restore the first 
best outcome by offering an optimal ex ante incentive contract to the innovator, committing to 
purchase the invention at a certain price and to sell the licenses at the Ramsey price. If the regulator 
is unable to contract ex ante with the potential innovator, the regulator can implement a second best 
allocation by issuing securities prior to R&D. The securities allow the holders either to purchase 
permits or to sell the securities to the regulator after R&D. 
2.2.2.2 Timing  and  Commitment 
As has become clear from the above summaries, most authors either assume that the regulator 
moves first and is able to ex ante commit to both the type and the level of his policy instrument, or 
that the regulator moves after observing R&D success and/or the degree of adoption, which we 
referred to as ex post regulation. Under pure adoption and under competitive conditions, it has been 
shown by Requate and Unold [72], [73] that ex ante and ex post regulation are (almost) equivalent. 
If, by contrast, there is only one firm to be regulated this equivalence breaks down, as Amacher and 
Malik [3] have shown. If we study innovation, there are typically few firms which engage in R&D 
and even fewer will be successful. Hence, we would expect the timing to be crucial for the 
incentives to innovate. This is the focus of the papers by Denicolò [19] and Requate [71] who 




Denicolò [19] was the first who explicitly compared ex ante and ex post regulation for both 
emission taxes and tradable permits in a model with an upstream monopolistic R&D firm and many 
polluting downstream firms. The perfectly competitive firms produce an output with constant 
returns to scale. Emissions are proportional to output. The new technology has a lower emissions-
per-output-ratio than the conventional one and the degree of reduction depends on the R&D 
investment. Denicolò finds that taxes and permits are equivalent for ex post regulation. For ex ante 
commitment, however, the instruments are not equivalent but both always lead to underinvestment 
in R&D. If the regulator commits to the second best level of the instruments, it depends on the social cost of pollution, whether taxes perform better or worse than permits. Despite the distortions 
Denicolo finds that usual ex ante commitment welfare dominates ex post regulation. 
Requate [71], similar to Parry [58], looks at a monopolistic upstream innovator who with a certain 
probability invents a new, exogenously given abatement technology. The R&D effort determines 
the probability of success. In case of R&D success, the innovator produces the new technology at 
constant marginal cost. A large number of asymmetric polluting downstream firms decide whether 
or not to adopt the new technology. The incentive for both, to adopt new technology, and to engage 
in R&D, is analyzed for two policy instruments: auctioned permits and emission taxes. Moreover, 
four different timing and commitment scenarios are considered: firstly, ex post regulation after both 
R&D success and adoption of the new technology, secondly interim regulation, which means that 
the regulator commits to a tax rate or the permit policy after observing R&D success but before the 
innovator prices his new technology. Finally, two types of ex ante commitment strategies are 
considered, one with a single tax rate or quota of permits, the other one with a commitment to a 
menu of tax rates or quotas of permits contingent on R&D success. The main result is that 
commitment to a menu of tax rates dominates all other policies. Moreover, taxes are superior to 
permits for both interim regulation and commitment to a menu of policy levels contingent on R&D 
success. The reason is that under permits the effective inverse demand function for the new 
technology is more elastic than under taxes and thus the distortion is more severe under permits. 
2.2.2.3  The Impact of Imperfect Competition on the Final Goods Market 
The next group of papers investigates incentives to innovate with the special focus on imperfect 
competition on the output market. Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas [41] assume Cournot competition 
whereas Innes and Bial [38] assume Bertrand competition with homogenous goods. Montero [54] 





Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas [41] study a Cournot duopoly with emissions proportional to output. 
Both firms are able to reduce their emissions-per-output ratio by investing into R&D and enjoy spillovers through the other firm’s R&D effort. The regulator ex ante commits to both an emission 
tax and an R&D subsidy (which can also take negative values). The authors find that the optimal 
tax rate falls short of marginal damage while the optimal subsidy is positive if the spillover effects 
are sufficiently high, and negative otherwise. The intuition for this result is straightforward: on the 
one hand, firms tend to underinvest in R&D because the private return from R&D is smaller than 
the social return and because they do not account for consumers’ surplus. On the other hand, firms 
strategically tend to overinvest in R&D in order to increase market shares. 
Innes and Bial [38], by contrast, look at a Bertrand duopoly with homogenous products. Investing 
in R&D, the firms can find a certain incremental innovation that would lower both their marginal 
cost and their marginal abatement cost. Since R&D success is stochastic, no, one or both firm(s) 
might be successful. If firms are ex post symmetric, the regulator is able to implement efficient 
pricing, production and abatement by levying the corresponding Pigouvian tax. If, however, firms 
are ex post asymmetric, the regulator is not able to implement the first best allocation by levying a 
tax only. The emission tax that is optimal with respect to the new technology would enable the 
R&D winner to capture the entire market and produce less than efficient. The regulator can solve 
this problem by combining an emission tax lower than marginal damage with a non-uniform 
relative standard which requires the winner to comply with the first best standard and the loser with 
a laxer standard. The authors further look at a setting where the regulator is not able to costless 
observe R&D outcomes. Surprisingly, the regulator can induce the firms to truthfully report their 
technologies and thus can implement the first best allocation. For this purpose he ex ante commits 
to levy an emission tax and to set a non-uniform relative standard contingent on the firms’ 
technology reports. Moreover he announces to monitor those firms that claim to be a loser of the 
R&D race but offer a positive output.  
Building on his companion paper [53], Montero [54] allows for R&D spillovers and assumes 
imperfect competition on output and permit market throughout the analysis. He studies both 
Cournot and price competition with differentiated products. Besides emission standards and permits 
 
 
22 he also analyses emission taxes. Montero finds that there is no strategic effect when levying an 
emission tax, as the marginal cost of both firms is constant. Taxes can provide more, less, or the 
same incentive to invest in innovation than emission standards and auctioned permits, whereas free 
permits offer less incentive than taxes. With Bertrand competition on the output market, taxes 
provide a higher incentive than an emission standard which in turn provides a higher incentive than 
free permits. Auctioned permits again can offer more, less or the same incentive than taxes. 
Montero concludes, that in the Cournot case, either emission standards, taxes, or auctioned permits 
can provide the highest incentive whereas in the Bertrand case this holds either for taxes or for 
auctioned permits. 
We would like to close this section by emphasizing a recent contribution by Parry et al. [60] who 
open up a somehow anti-innovative perspective by showing within a dynamic framework, including 
the aspect of time explicitly, that the net present value of the additional welfare gain from even 
optimally employing new technologies may be relatively small compared to optimally exploiting 
existing abatement opportunities, i.e optimal pollution control without innovation. Thus, they 
conclude: “These findings appear to contradict earlier assertions by some economists that 
technological advance might be more important than achieving optimal pollution control in the 
design of environmental policies.” (p.252) 
3  Models with Growth, Exhaustable Resources and Pollution 
Up to this point we have studied models with limited dynamics such as two- or three-stage models 
in the tradition of the theories of industrial organization and regulation. Technological progress is, 
of course, also an important issue in models of economic growth. The question of whether or not an 
exhaustible resource can be substituted by man-made capital, and whether or not a sustainable 
growth path with non-declining wealth is feasible, has been an important issue of research since the 
late seventies. Path breaking essays in this field are, among others, the works by Dasgupta and Heal 
[16], [17], Solow [84], and Stiglitz [85]. It would burst this survey to summarize all the special 
 
 
23 features and results of this early literature.
15 If at all, technological progress enters these models in 
an exogenous way, for example by assuming that technological progress is resource-augmenting. 
The issue of technological progress has enjoyed a new boost with the rise of endogenous growth 
theory, which, since the late nineties, was subsequently applied to questions of resource-saving and 
pollution-reducing technological progress.  
In this realm of theories we can first of all distinguish between one-sector and multi-sector models. 
Among the latter we can further differentiate between aggregated and disaggregated models. In the 
following we will only briefly summarize the one-sector and the aggregated multi-sector models.
16 
We will put more emphasis on the disaggregated multi-sector models since those, by modelling 
R&D explicitly, have a stronger link to the models of section 2.  
3.1 One-Sector  Growth  Models 
In the one-sector models aggregate output can either be consumed or converted into physical 
capital. Long-term growth is feasible due to constant returns to scale with respect to man-made 
factors of production. The models can be classified according to the respective engine of growth.  
In the so called AK-models growth relies on the accumulation of capital.
17 The basic model is 
characterized by a production function that features constant returns to scale with respect to the only 
input, i.e. capital. Since the basic model does not allow for input substitution and for non-man-made 
factors entering the production function as essential inputs, most of the authors apply AK models to 
environmental and resource problems where the pollution is a by-product of capital. Among those 
Gradus and Smulders [29], Ligthart and van der Ploeg [47], [48], Smulders and Gradus [83], and 
Stokey [86] assume that an environmental damage is caused by a flow of pollution. Baranzini and 
Bourguignon [4], Withagen [93], Mohtadi [52], Chevé [15] study environmental problems through 
stocks of pollution. By contrast, Aghion and Howitt [2], and Groth and Schou [33] take into account 
renewable and non-renewable resources, respectively. A main result of this literature is that if there 
is a critical ecological threshold of pollution, or if the resource is non-renewable, the pollution 
 
 
24 intensity of production or the input intensity of the resource, respectively, must go to zero in order 
to guarantee unlimited growth in consumption. Aghion and Howitt and other authors identify 
conditions under which sustainable growth in the sense of non-declining utility is possible. The 
authors of this literature are less interested in the comparison of different policy instruments in 
order to spur technological progress.  
In another type of one-sector models growth relies on positive externalities such as in Romer 
[75]. In this kind of model, investment in physical capital exerts an externality in the sense that 
knowledge spills over to a human capital stock (“learning by doing”) which is a public good and is 
responsible for augmenting technological progress with respect to the non-reproducible factor. The 
following authors use such a model to analyze environmental or resource problems: Musu [55], van 
der Ploeg and Ligthart [87], Ligthart and van der Ploeg [48], Musu and Lines [56] set up models 
with renewable resources, whereas Michel and Rotillion [50] a model with pollution. 
Barro [5] developed a model where growth relies on public spending. He incorporates two man-
made production factors, i.e. physical capital and productive public spending. This approach has 
been applied to resource and environmental economics by Ligthart and van der Ploeg [47], [48], 
van der Ploeg and Ligthart [87], den Butter and Hofkes [18] for renewable resources and by Nielsen 
et al. [57]and Bovenberg and de Mooij [7] for pollution.  
Finally, there are models that link one-sector and multi-sector models by considering physical and 
human capital that are accumulated separately but whose production technology is identical as e.g. 
Smulders [81], [82]. 
3.2  Aggregated Multi-Sector Growth Models 
In contrast to the one-sector models, the multi-sector models allow for the input intensity of non-
man-made factors to vary since the factors are used in different sectors/processes. The aggregated 
multi-sector models are characterized by several sectors of man-made goods (e.g. a physical 
capital/consumption good and human capital) that are accumulated separately and that are produced 
 
 
25 by different production technologies. Physical capital and human capital usually enter the 
production function as reproducible factors. Non-reproducible factors can be included as well. 
Knowledge is often assumed to be a public good and to be productivity augmenting. The “Uzawa-
Lucas” model is an example for an aggregated multi-sector model. Here production of human 
capital is independent of physical capital. Applications of aggregated multi-sector models in 
Environmental and Resource Economics are the contributions of Gradus and Smulders [29], 
Bovenberg and Smulders [8], [9], Smulders [81], van Ewijk and Wijnbergen [88], Hofkes [36], 
Rosendahl [77], Byrne [13], Aghion and Howitt [2], and Schou [79]. The main issues of those 
models are, first, the trade-off between growth and environmental quality, secondly, conditions for 
feasible and sustainable development paths, thirdly, the question whether or not sustainable paths 
are optimal and vice versa, and last but not least the question how environmental policy instruments 
affect welfare.  
3.3  Disaggregated Multi-Sector Growth Models 
The  disaggregated multi-sector models explicitly model the R&D sector. They highlight the 
microeconomic foundation behind investment in R&D and shed some light on the mechanisms 
leading to non-decreasing returns. The development of new varieties of capital, consumption, or 
intermediate goods constitutes technological progress. These new varieties can arise on a horizontal 
and on a vertical dimension. Both Romer [76] and Rivera-Batiz and Romer [74] explain 
endogenous growth by increasing horizontal product differentiation where innovation can be 
depicted as introduction of new final goods or of new types of intermediate or differentiated capital 
goods. In the first case, it is the households’ preferences for diversity that gives rise to increasing 
returns, in the second case, it is the growing specialization that prevents the marginal product of 
reproducible factors from falling.  
Grossman and Helpman [34] and Aghion and Howitt [1], by contrast, explain unlimited growth by 
vertical product differentiation where product quality of intermediate goods is improved through 
 
 
26 R&D. Higher quality of intermediate products, in turn, boosts growth by being more efficient in 
production. The producer of an intermediate good is a monopolist and holds a patent for his 
innovation. Other firms engage in R&D to find a better product and substitute the former innovation 
by a new one. This process is sometimes called the “process of creative destruction. 
Disaggregated multi-sector models have been applied to renewable resources by Grimaud [30], to 
non-renewable resources by Scholz and Ziemes [78], Bretschger [10], Bretschger and Smulders 
[11], Grimaud and Rougé [32], and finally by van Zon and Yetkiner [91] to a resource whose 
scarcity is indirectly considered by assuming that its price rises exogenously over time. 
Furthermore, it has been applied to accumulating pollution by Grimaud and Ricci [31], and to a 
mere flow of pollution by Hung et al. [37], Verdier [92] and Elbasha and Roe [23]. Schou [80] 
combines the aspects of depletion of a non-renewable resource and pollution. In table 3 we list the 
main features of all the different models. They have several features in common. There are usually 
two or three market imperfections. Even without the aspects of environmental amenities and 
depletion of exhaustible resources almost all the models work with the assumption of a 
monopolistic market structure for some intermediate good. The authors justify this assumption by 
innovation. Suppliers of new products usually earn a monopoly rent. The second market 
imperfection comes from the public good character of new ideas. The positive spillovers of new 
knowledge are usually not internalized. The third market imperfection is created by pollution, in 
case that this is included into the model. Depletion of resources, by contrast, does not cause market 
imperfections in this field of literature. The reason is that all authors assume that the property rights 
for the exhaustible resources are well defined (private ownership economies) and that the private 
rate of time preference does not differ from the social rate. Hence, if authors come to study 
decentralized economies, the same policy tools are applied throughout the literature in order to 
correct for those market imperfections: a subsidy for the monopolist who offers the intermediate 
good, a subsidy on R&D, usually paid as a subsidy on wages in the R&D sector, and a tax on the 
 
 
27 pollutant or the issuance of an equivalent amount of tradable emission permits. In the following 
section we summarize the results of selected papers in more detail. 
3.4  Results of Particular Models with Non-Renewable Resource and/or Pollution 
3.4.1  Resource-Saving Technological Progress in the Presence of a Non-Renewable Resource 
Grimaud and Rougé [32] draw on the model of vertical innovation by Aghion and Howitt [1]. A 
non-renewable resource, necessary for production, enters the production function of the final-goods 
sector. Since there is no pollution, the utility depends on consumption only. The authors find that 
positive long-run growth is always positive if the R&D sector is sufficiently productive. In the 
steady-state, optimal and equilibrium growth rates can be negative or positive. Without policy 
intervention the growth path in the decentralized market equilibrium is not optimal. Two cases may 
occur: too little or too much growth. In the first case, the growth rate of resource extraction is less 
(greater) than optimal if the elasticity of marginal utility is lower (higher) than one. Excessive 
growth, by contrast, occurs only under a special parameter constellation. In this case both the output 
and the extraction growth rate may be greater than optimal if the elasticity of marginal utility is 
smaller than one. Optimal growth can be restored in a decentralized economy by subsidizing 
(taxing) the wage in the R&D sector in the case of too little (excessive) growth.  
Scholz and Ziemes [78], by contrast, build on models of horizontal innovation. A non-renewable 
resource enters the production function of the final-goods sector. In the decentralized economy two 
market imperfections occur: the intermediate good is supplied by a monopolist, and the R&D firm 
neglects that the knowledge is a public good and raises labor productivity. Scholz und Ziemes do 
not study optimal growth but rather study the market solution only which turns out to be inefficient 
and is characterized by a too low rate of resource extraction. Despite these market failures, per 
capita consumption might grow in equilibrium if certain “technological prerequisites” are met. The 
authors further show that there may be multiple balanced growth paths. These indeterminacies may 
be caused by inefficient resource extraction. A necessary condition for indeterminacies in a growing 
 
 
28 economy is that the partial production elasticity of capital must be smaller than that of the 
exhaustible resource. 
Van Zon and Yetkiner [91] combine horizontal and vertical innovation. Energy and capital are 
necessary to operate intermediate goods. Technological progress arises by developing new, more 
productive intermediates which, however, do not crowd out the previous intermediates 
immediately. Thus, productivity growth at the aggregate level is the result of both preference for 
more variety and for higher quality. Moreover, van Zon and Yetkiner allow for substitution of 
capital and energy. They assume that total energy supply is exogenous and that the energy price is 
growing at an exogenously given rate. The authors find that the growth rate depends positively on 
the rate of technological change and that it exceeds the growth rate of Romer’s [76] model. 
Continuously rising real energy prices tend to slow down growth and lower the pace of introduction 
of new intermediates. This may be considered as surprising since it is often argued that scarcity of 
energy spurs technological progress, in particular energy-saving technological progress. In fact, 
however, energy taxes affect R&D efforts in a negative way. The authors nevertheless do introduce 
energy taxes in order to collect revenues which are then used to subsidize R&D directly. This 
indeed leads to higher growth but only as long as R&D activities are not too high. 
In a more recent paper, Bretschger [10] demonstrates that sustainable development can be generated 
despite seemingly unfavourable conditions: inputs are poor substitutes, population grows at a 
positive rate, the supply of material is limited, and the non-renewable resource is an essential input 
for the R&D sector. In his model labor and the non-renewable resource are the primary inputs that 
are used in the R&D sector as well as in the intermediates sector. Similar to Romer [76] and 
Grossman and Helpman [34] innovation comes through an increasing variety of intermediates. 
Bretschger finds that despite the above mentioned unfavourable conditions, economic growth is 
possible if structural change and an increasing labor force are strong enough to sustain knowledge 
accumulation. If, however, labor reallocation between sectors is not fast enough, which may happen 
due to adjustment cost, wrong expectations or both, the innovation and per-capita consumption 
 
 
29 growth rates decrease over time. Hence, Bretschger’s policy conclusion is that facilitating labor 
reallocation is the best approach to support sustainable development when there are adjustment 
costs. 
In an extremely complex model Bretschger and Smulders [11] study how substitution 
possibilities and a limited supply of physical capital affects sustainability. Their work, too, draws on 
the models of horizontal innovation à la Romer [76] and Grossman and Helpman [34]. Primary 
inputs are a non-renewable resource and both skilled and unskilled labor. Moreover, there are two 
types of capital, homogenous and differentiated capital. Homogenous capital is produced by skilled 
labor only, whereas differentiated capital is produced by means of R&D and unskilled labor. R&D 
is created by skilled labor and public knowledge. Finally, there are two consumption goods, a 
standard and a high-tech good. The household’s expenditure shares are assumed to be constant with 
respect to these goods. The standard good is produced by the non-renewable resource and 
homogenous capital, whereas the high-tech good is produced by the resource and differentiated 
capital. Thus, there is technological progress in one final good sector only. Further, resources can be 
substituted by man-made factors only. The assumption of two final goods sectors allows to account 
for the sectors to differ in their elasticities of substitution and for substitution between sectors. In 
the decentralized economy the usual market imperfections exist: monopoly power for differentiated 
capital and R&D spillovers. As a main result the authors find that long-run growth can be sustained 
under free market conditions even when elasticities of substitution between capital and resources 
are low and supply of physical capital is limited. Surprisingly, however, poor substitutability 
between homogenous capital and the non-renewable resource in the standard goods sector, which 
competes for skilled labor with the R&D sector, turns out to be favourable for growth. By contrast, 
and less surprising, strong dependence on non-renewable resources in the sector that employs the 
innovations, i.e. the high-tech good sector, is bad for growth. 
 
 
30 3.4.2 Pollution-Reducing  Technological  Progress 
Hung et al. [37] belong to the first authors who applied endogenous growth theory to issues of 
pollution and pollution-reducing technological progress. They build on Romer’s [76] model of 
horizontal innovation. Besides labor, the final good it produced by clean and dirty intermediate 
inputs, where the latter cause pollution. The authors abstract from accumulation of the pollutant. 
Thus, only the flow of emissions causes environmental damage and disutility to the consumers. For 
both intermediates there is an R&D sector with firms which try to develop a better design for the 
intermediate goods, whereas R&D does not affect the “cleanliness” of the dirty intermediates. R&D 
success is stochastic and the firms have to pay fixed research cost. Production and develpment cost 
of the clean and dirty intermediate may differ. In the decentralized economy the three meanwhile 
well know market imperfections occur: monopolistic competition on the intermediate goods sector, 
positive R&D spillovers, and pollution. As a main result the authors find that the balanced growth 
equilibrium is unstable, whereas the only stable equilibria are those of unbalanced growth where 
either the clean or the dirty sector is growing. Hence, the authors compare the growth rates of five 
different scenarios: market equilibria with the clean or with the dirty sector growing, social optima 
with clean or with the dirty sector growing, and finally socially optimal growth without 
environmental concern (“second best solution”). The authors show that the market equilibrium 
growth rate might be lower than the first best growth rate. Thus, pollution control is not necessarily 
detrimental to growth. Pittel [65] (p. 78) criticizes that whether or not research will or should take 
place in the clean, in the dirty, or even in both sectors, is completely independent of consumer 
preferences for the environment. Rather, specialization in clean or dirty R&D is entirely due to 




Verdier [92] also considers horizontal innovation, drawing on Grossman and Helpman. [34]. 
However, more variety arises in the final goods sector rather than at the intermediate goods level. It 
is also the final goods that cause the pollution: each variety of a final good is characterized by a 
certain constant emissions-per-output ratio. Pollution affects the consumers’ utility. R&D firms create new products and also choose their emissions-per-output ratio. At this end cleaner products 
are more costly to develop. However, as the stock of knowledge increases, it becomes less costly in 
terms of labor to develop a new product with a certain emissions-per-output ratio. Thus, there is a 
trade-off between growth of product variety and “cleanliness” of the products to be developed. In 
the decentralized economy Verdier introduces an R&D-subsidy and either an emission tax or a 
performance standard (fixed emissions-per-output ratio).
18 The authors show that, while emission 
taxes need not be detrimental to economic growth, a performance standard has a negative effect on 
growth. Comparing the two regimes, the authors find that the performance standards are less cost 
effective than emission taxes and that under emission taxes less resources are used for production 
and thus more resources are available for R&D whereas more resources are used in production 
under performance standards. First-best can be implemented by combining an R&D subsidy with 
either an emission tax or a performance standard, where the subsidy is higher in the latter case. 
When the regulator is not able to pay an R&D subsidy and the emission tax and performance 
standard are set to implement a fixed emission level, the ranking of the instruments is not that clear-
cut. 
Elbasha and Roe [23] analyze the link between innovation, trade, growth, and environmental 
quality. They also draw on horizontal innovation in the tradition of Grossman and Helpman [34], 
Romer [76], and Rivera-Batiz&Romer [74] where the range of intermediates is expanded. Elbasha 
and Roe consider a Heckscher-Ohlin like model with capital and labor as primary input factors and 
two traded goods. They distinguish two scenarios with respect to pollution: emissions are either 
proportional to aggregate output of the final good or they are generated when using intermediate 
inputs. The flow of emissions affects utility of consumers in a negative way. The authors find that 
long-run growth increases with the country’s endowments, -the productivity of R&D, the elasticity 
of intertemporal substitution, with a smaller rate of time preference, and a smaller elasticity of 
substitution between the intermediates. Further they find that consumer’s care about environment 
might slow down, promote, or might not affect growth. The effects of trade on both environmental 
 
 
32 quality and welfare are ambiguous. Moreover, the growth rate in the decentralized economy can be 
smaller or greater than the optimal growth rate. In the balanced growth equilibrium, however, the 
decentralized growth rate is below the optimal rate. If emissions are proportional to aggregate 
output, environmental quality decays at a constant rate along the balanced growth path. For the 
alternative approach: environmental quality may decay, stay constant or improve at a constant rate. 
In the case where emissions are proportional to aggregate output and where a decentralized growth 
path is below the optimal path, the authors derive the second best levels of different growth 
enhancing policy instruments such as an R&D subsidy and an output subsidy. By contrast to other 
papers cited above, the authors do not focus on sustainability. Hence, in the long run optimal 
growth may be associated with a decrease in welfare. In a numerical application of the model the 
authors allow for an abatement technology which becomes more effective with a higher stock of 
knowledge. Here they find that trade promotes growth but worsens environmental quality and that 
the decentralized growth path is below the optimal one. If the more capital-intensive sector, which 
is an importer, has to pay an emission tax, then growth increases. If the other sector has to pay an 
emission tax, the reverse holds true. 
Grimaud [30] disaggregates the model by Aghion and Howitt [2] and focuses on policy instruments 
in order to implement the first best sustainable growth path. Grimaud, too, identifies the usual three 
distortions: the intermediate goods are produced by monopolists, knowledge is a public good, and 
pollution in production causes an externality on consumers, and he proposes a subsidy on the 
purchase of intermediates, an R&D subsidy, and a free allocation of tradable emission permits in 
order to restore efficiency. He finds that for each triplet of instruments there exists a balanced 
growth path. The different paths generated by the different levels of instruments display exhibit a 
trade-off between environmental quality and growth. For the socially optimal growth path the 
number of permits decrease progressively. Therefore pollution decreases, while the price of permits 
increases. The impact of environmental policy on growth is as we would expect it to be: reducing 
the number of permits has a negative impact on the growth of output since the production sector 
 
 
33 must cope with less amounts of the polluting inputs. Moreover, the value of patents decreases by 
depressing demand for intermediate goods whereas the marginal cost of R&D falls. Note, that the 
final effect hinges on the assumption that pollution is caused by output. Hence, no substitution from 
dirty to clean inputs is possible.  
Grimaud and Ricci [31] compare the decentralized economy in the model of horizontal innovation à 
la Romer [76] to the one in the model of vertical innovation à la Grossman and Helpman [34] and 
Aghion and Howitt [1]. In both models an accumulating pollutant is an implicit input to production 
with an elasticity of substitution equal to one. The utility function is additively separable in 
consumption and environmental amenities that depends on the stock of pollution and the natural 
rate of assimilation. As usual the set of policy tools is given by a subsidy to the monopolistic 
supplier of the input, an R&D subsidy, and instead of permits, an emission tax to cope with 
pollution. Among the different growth paths generated by different levels of the policy instruments, 
we again face a trade-off between economic growth and environmental quality, i.e. a higher growth 
rate of output is associated with a higher growth rate of the pollution stock. Moreover, along a 
balanced growth path, subsidies are constant and emission taxes increase at a constant rate. For 
equal levels of the policy tools, the growth rate of output is higher in the vertical innovation than in 
the model of horizontal innovation. The optimal R&D subsidy with respect to strong sustainability 
is greater in the model of horizontal innovation than in the model of vertical innovation. The same 
results hold if the regulator issued free permits instead of levying emission taxes. 
3.4.3  Pollution-Reducing cum Resource-Saving Technological Progress 
Schou [80] also draws on Romer’s model of horizontal innovation and combines the issues of 
resource extraction and pollution. Research improves productivity and growth. A non-renewable 
resource enters the production function of the final-goods sector, but extraction of the resource 
causes pollution. The author abstracts from both accumulation of physical capital and accumulation 
of the pollutant which as a flow variable negatively affects the consumer’s utility. The assumption 
 
 
34 of constant elasticity of marginal utility of both consumption and pollution is a necessary condition 
for balanced growth paths to be optimal (see Bovenberg and Smulders [8]). Schou finds that 
although positive growth is optimal, consumption on the optimal balanced growth path either grows 
or declines as utility improves even though consumption declines. The reason is that environmental 
improvements compensate for the decline in consumption. Pollution necessarily diminishes over 
time (since it is generated by a non-renewable resource). In the market economy knowledge and 
consumption growth rates are suboptimal and growth may be negative even though positive growth 
is feasible. There are the familiar three sources of market failure: monopolistic supply of the 
intermediate good, knowledge spill-over through R&D, and pollution. An R&D subsidy together 
with a subidy for the purchase of intermediates implements the optimal path. The pollution 
externality has no distortionary effect as it is always optimal to extract all of the resource stock, and 
therefore, the rate of change of the resource price over time is not distorted. Thus, an environmental 
policy like emission taxes is unnecessary. If the marginal utility of consumption is greater than one, 
there will be a “win-win” situation when subsidies are used as described above: knowledge and 
consumption growth rise and long run environmental conditions are improved. 
4 Conclusions 
We have surveyed the literature on pollution-reducing and resource-saving technological progress. 
The literature can be divided into two branches, the microeconomic partial equilibrium models 
which focus on the timing and commitment of regulation, on the comparison of different policy 
instruments, and on the impact of different market structures whereas the second branch focuses on 
growth and technological progress in the framework of endogenous growth theory. Concerning the 
microeconomic models the main conclusion is that instruments which provide incentives through 
the price mechanism by and large perform better than command and control policies. Even though, 
it is important that the regulator either anticipates the new technologies to a certain extent or that he 
reacts in an optimal way on invention and adoption of new technology. Under competitive 
 
 
35 conditions and perfect foresight, different authors established the result that ex ante commitment 
and ex post optimal policies generate equivalent or at least similar allocations. Under imperfect 
market conditions, the policy conclusions are less clear cut. Under myopic environmental policies 
or long term commitment to the levels of policy instruments, by contrast, emission taxes tend to 
provide a stronger incentive to invest in both R&D and adoption of new technology as compared to 
permits. The reason is that the permit price falls if new technology diffuses, providing a lower 
incentive for firms with old technology to invest in pollution-reducing technology.  
With respect to the growth models the bottom line is that the bulk of models shows that, unless 
pollution affects productivity in a negative way, a policy which improves environmental conditions 
lowers the growth rate of physical consumption/capital goods at the same time. Moreover, the 
different market imperfections can be treated separately by three instruments: a subsidy on skilled 
labor in R&D in order to account for positive R&D spillovers, an output subsidy on intermediate, 
innovative products in order to cope with market power on new products which are subject to patent 
protection, and either pollution taxes or tradable permits to deal with pollution. 
The issue of timing and interaction between the regulator and the innovator is generally not studied 
in the growth literature. Usually the implicit assumption on timing in the growth literature is that the 
regulator acts like a Stackelberg leader by committing to a whole path of tax or subsidy rates. 
Dynamic interaction between innovators and a regulator, as studied in detail in the static, or 
restrictedly dynamic microeconomic models, is much more difficult to analyze since it calls for 
dynamic game theoretical concepts for models with infinite time horizon. Nevertheless such 
analysis is important and will hopefully be subject of further research.  
 
Notes 
Obviously, this distinction is not sharp since new production processes also require new products and vice versa. 
We abstract from traditional market failures such as monopoly and monopsony power on markets for primary 
resources. 
Among economists there is no general agreement about the gap between social and private discount rates and 
thus on the claim that non-renewable resources are under-estimated by market prices. Our view on this dispute is 
 
 
36 that the first two issues, the common pool problem and pollution, are at least more severe than the problem of 
discrepancy between the social and the private discount rate. 
In reality, the MAC function is in general piecewise linear. E.g. a scrubber might be able to abate 70%-80% of 
SO2 emissions, whereas a cheaper technology might be able to abate 60%-70%. In the literature it is mostly 
assumed that there are sufficiently many pollution-reducing technologies, such that a firm´s real abatement cost 
function can be approximated by a continuous function. 
To become a bit more formal we denote by   the joint costs which a typical firm incurs to produce   
units of output with no more than   units of emissions. For this definition it is not relevant, whether the firm has 
an end-of-pipe or an integrated technology. The firm’s profit is then given by π . In the 
absence of regulation the competitive firm chooses q  and   such that   and C , providing 
a maximal profit   and an emission level  . It is plausible to assume C ,  , 
 for   and C . We refer to   as the marginal abatement costs. If now the firm 
is constrained to emit no more than   units of the pollutant, the rule   induces some output   
and a reduced profit  . The full abatement cost can then be defined as 
, which is the forgone profit resulting from reducing emissions from   to  . It is easy to 
show that the reduced abatement cost function   has the same properties as C  with respect to e. 
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The above formula refers to a system of auctioned permits. In case of free permits we would have 
 where e is the initial endowment of permits. If the adopting firms 
cannot influence the price of permits, this last relationship is equivalent to (1). 
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The shift of the marginal abatement cost function through new technology needs, of course, not necessarily be a 
parallel one. 
If the phases of R&D and adoption can be separated, there is also the possibility of interim regulation. Requate 
[71] considers such a scenario. 
In a second scenario Requate and Unold [73] study ex ante and ex post regulation, where the regulator 
anticipates and takes the new technology into account. 
Although the authors use the term „precommitment“, we prefer to talk about ex ante commitment. 
In earlier papers also Hahn [35] and Requate [66], [67], [68] allow for imperfectly competitive permit markets. 
They do not, however, focus on innovation and technological progress. 
In a recent comment on Montero[53], Bruneau [12] holds the view that performance standards generate a greater 
incentive to innovate than permits even under perfect competition. Moreover, he extends Montero’s analysis to 
the case of increasing marginal costs and argues that in this case both auctioned and free permits dominate 
performance standards. Bruneau, however, neither carries out a complete equilibrium analysis nor a welfare 
comparison, and thus does not rank the instruments with respect to total social costs or welfare. Since 
performance standards lead to inefficient abatement levels in the static case, it cannot be ruled out that they lead 
to inefficiently high investment.  
Trading of permits thus implies that the buyer (seller) of a permit buys (sells) a whole stream of emissions over 
time. Such a scheme may discourage trade if there is uncertainty about the future value of permits and if traders 
are risk averse. 
The authors refer to the regulator’s commitment after R&D but before adoption as ex post regulation. 
The interested reader is referred to Pezzey and Toman [63]. 
We adopted this classification from Pittel [65]. 
The term “AK model”, or “A-times-K-model” refers to the assumption that the aggregate production function is 
linear in the stock of capital, and thus, by contrast to the famous Solow model, does not exhibit decreasing 
returns to scale.  
Besides the usual knowledge spillovers there are two more imperfections through R&D in this model: first the 
“consumer-surplus effect” since innovators do not fully take into account the increase of consumer surplus 
coming from creation of new products, secondly, the “profit destruction effect” since the innovator does not 
consider the destructive effect on the profits of other firms. By the special assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz-CES 
preferences the two effects cancel out and the regulator has to correct for only two market failures. 
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Figure 1: Change of an Adopting Firm’s Compliance Costs under Emission Taxes 
 
 








Special Other Features 
Amacher & Malik 
(2002) 
Emission Taxes  Ex Ante,  
Ex Post 




Adoption Subsidies and 
Discriminatory Emission Taxes 
Ex Ante  Yes  Two New Technologies; 




Emission Taxes,  
Abatement Subsidies,  
Emission Standards, 
Free Permits 
Myopic No   





Myopic No   
Gersbach & Glazer 
(1999) 
Free Permits  Ex Post  Yes  Imperfect Competition on Output 
Market; Hold-Up Problem 
Kennedy (1999)  Free/Auctioned Permits and 
Adjustment Rule 
Ex Ante  No  Uncertainty about Damage; 
Permits Do Not Expire 
Kennedy & Laplante 
(1999) 
Emission Taxes,  
Permits 
Ex Ante,  
Ex Post 
No   
Laffont & Tirole 
(1996a) 
Permits,  
Permits and Futures, 
Permits and Price Support 
Policy/Options 
Ex Ante  No  Shadow Cost of Public Funds 
Included; Uncertainty about 
Firms’ Valuation of Emitting 
Milliman & Prince 
(1989) 
Emission Taxes,  
Abatement Subsidies,  
Auctioned Permits,  
Free Permits,  
Emission Standards 
Myopic No   
Malueg (1989)  Permits  Myopic  No   
Montero (2002a)  Auctioned Permits,  
Free Permits, 





Yes   (Im)perfect Competition on 
Output and Permit Market; 
Continuum of New Technologies 
Petrakis & 
Xepapadeas (1999) 
Emission Taxes  Ex Ante, 
Ex Post 
Yes  Monopoly on Output Market; 
Continuum of New Technologies 
Phaneuf & Requate 
(2002) 
Permits and  
Banking of Permits 
Ex Ante  No  Aggregate Uncertainty about 
Abatement Costs; Continuum of 
New Technologies 









No Asymmetric  Firms 










No  Symmetric Firms 
Van Soest (2003)  Emission Taxes, 
Emission Standards 
Ex Ante  Yes  Technology Follows Stochastic 
Jump Process 
Van Soest & Bulte 
(2001) 
- -  Yes  Technology Follows Stochastic 
Jump Process 
































Ex Post,  
Ex Ante 
No Increasing  Yes  Endogenous 
Innovation Size 
Fischer et al. 
(2003) 













Emission Taxes and  
R&D Subsidies 






Innes & Bial 
(2002) 
Emisson Taxes and 
Emission Standards 








Incentive Contract,  
Permits and Securities and 
Licensing Tax  
Interim,  
Ex Ante  
Yes Increasing  No  Shadow Cost of 










No -  Yes  Imperfect 
Competition on 
Output and Permit 
Market; Spillovers 
Parry (1995)  Emission Taxes  Ex Ante  Yes  Constant,  
Increasing 
No  (Im)perfect Costless 
Imitation 
Parry (1998)  Emission Taxes, 
Free Permits, 




Yes Constant  Yes  (In)complete 
Diffusion; (Im)perfect 
Costless Imitation 
Parry et al. 
(2003) 










Yes Increasing  No  Imperfectly 
Competitive R&D 
Sector 
Table 2: Models of Innovation and Diffusion.
 
 








      Resource
(Input of Sector x) 
 
Pollution 


































































H  Intermediates Sector: EoS* btw. Labor and 
Resource Constant, Lower than Unity; R&D 
Sector: Unitary EoS* btw. Labor and Resource 
D    Positive Population/Labor Force Growth; 





(Both Final Goods) 
H  Constant EoS* btw. Capital and Resource; 
Different Substitution Conditions are Analyzed 
D    Two Final Goods Sectors; Two Types of 
Physical Capital and Labor; Variety of Only One 






Final Goods Sector or 
Usage of 
Intermediates) 
H  EMU** of Environmental Quality: Constant, 
Smaller/Greater than Unity; Constant EMU** of 
Consumption; Unitary Elasticity of Marginal Rate 
of Substitution btw. Consumption and 
Environmental Quality w.r.t Consumption  
D, C  R&D Subsidies; Import 
Subsidies; Export Subsidies; 
Capital Taxes; Output Subsidies 
to Intermediates Sector; 
Emission Taxes 
Small Open Economy Characterized by 
Labor/Capital Endowment; Two Final Goods 





Final Goods Sector) 
H  Unitary EoS* btw. Emissions and Output; 
EMU** Higher Unity w.r.t Consumption 
D, C  Pollution Permits, R&D 
Subsidy, Subsidy to the Demand 
of Monopolies 
Emissions Enter Production Function As Inputs; 
Isoelastic Utility Function; Environmental 






Final Goods Sector 
and Assimilation 
Rate)  
H,V  Unitary EoS* btw. Emissions and Output; 
EMU** w.r.t. Consumption Higher Unity  
D, C  R&D Subsidy, Subsidy to 
Monopolists, Emission Taxes 
Emissions Enter Production Function As Inputs; 
Utility Function Separable in Consumption and 





V  Unitary EoS* btw. Capital and Resource  D, C  R&D Subsidies/Taxes   
Hung et al. 
(1994) 
Flow Pollution  
(Usage Dirty 
Intermediates) 
H    D, C    Clean and Dirty Intermediates; Two Research 
Sectors; TFP of Final Goods Sector Rises with 







H  Unitary EoS* btw. Capital and Resource   D  Pigou Subsidy to Capital and 
Knowledge Formation 
Indeterminacies of Equilibria May Arise 
Schou (2002)  Non-Renewable 
(Final Goods Sector) 
Flow Pollution 
(Resource) 
H  Unitary EoS* btw. Capital and Resource; 
Constant EMU** of Consumption and Pollution 
D, C  R&D Subsidies, Subsidies on 
Purchase of Intermediates 
Constant Elasticity of Pollution Function; No 
Capital Accumulation; Pollution Externality 
Does Not Distort Economy 
 
 
47 Van Zon & 
Yetkiner 
(2003) 
Available at Any 
Quantity 
(Final Goods) 
V, H  Unitary EoS* btw. Raw Capital and Energy; 
Unitary EoS* btw. Labor and Aggregate 
Effective Capital; EoS* of Different 
Intermediates Greater One 
D  Energy Taxes, R&D Subsidies  Resource Price Rises Continuously at Given 
Rate; Intermediates Differ w.r.t. Energy 




Flow Pollution  
(Aggregate Output 
Final Goods Sector) 
H  Consumers’ EoS* btw. Any Two Products 
Greater Unity 
D, C  Emission Taxes; Performance 
Standards; R&D Subsidy and 
Emission Taxes; R&D Subsidy 
and Performance Standard 
Labor Is Only Input; Differentiated Products with 
Different Emission-Output-Ratios 
Table 3: Disaggregated Multi-Secotor Models with Resources/Pollution Incorporated. 
           *EoS = Elasticity of Substitution 
         **EMU = Elasticity of Marginal Utility 
 
 
 
48 